Introduction
Research on international tax competition is a crucial building block in the ongoing effort to better understand the consequences of economic globalization. Collecting resources from people and firms and (re-)allocating these resources to the production of public goods and mechanisms for the redistribution of wealth are still the most basic functions of the state. Despite large-scale privatization and other economic reforms in recent years, most states continue to collect and allocate around 30 to 50 percent of their gross domestic product.
Studies on the extent and effects of international tax competition have focused primarily on the supplyside of the issue -that is, policy-makers' responses to the problem in terms of tax reforms and variation of tax rates. The "demand-side" of the issue -when and why increasing economic openness and international tax competition, to the extent we observe them, lead to which types of responses (political demands) by which economic actors -remains largely unexplored. 2 In this paper, we develop a demand-side explanation that accounts for corporate responses to international tax competition. The starting point is that economic openness amplifies the competitiveness effects of differences in firms' tax burdens. Besides its general effect of promoting competition among firms, economic openness creates new possibilities for firms operating out of lower tax jurisdictions to enter markets in higher tax jurisdictions. And it creates new possibilities for firms domiciled in higher tax jurisdictions to engage in tax avoidance by redomiciling or shifting taxable profits through other means to 1 See, e.g., Rodrik/van Ypersele 2001; Tanzi 1995; Genschel 2000a; Hallerberg/Basinger 1997 Basinger/Hallerberg 2001; Gould 2000; Baker/Gould 2001; Rodrik 1997; Wilson 1999; Garrett 1998. 2 The "supply-side" and "demand-side" terminology is standard in conventional public choice theory (e.g. Frey/Kirchgässner 1994) . For an earlier application of these concepts to taxation policy see Peters 1991. For a more general observation that the demand-side in international financial issues requires further analysis, see Frieden and Martin (2001:23). lower tax jurisdictions.
Assuming profit-maximizing behavior by all firms, one might expect that all firms adopt the same or very similar strategies for reducing their respective tax burden. In the real world, this is often not the case. A frequently observed pattern is that, as economic openness increases, some firms begin to exploit more actively than others inter-jurisdictional differences in tax burdens, thus creating uneven de facto tax burdens for firms operating in the same market. The extant literature provides no explanation of the economic and political processes that may then unfold. In principle, "run-away" firms may trigger a chain reaction of tax avoidance that leads to lower corporate taxes across the board (de facto and/or in terms of nominal tax rates). Or it may trigger political reactions that prevent an erosion of the tax-base. Our explanation focuses on three possible responses by firms experiencing a disadvantageous tax burden. Firms can engage in tax avoidance as well (ADJUSTMENT). They can lobby policy-makers to reduce taxes towards the level tax avoiders would be willing to pay (VOICE option one), or to curb tax avoidance through new regulation and/or stricter enforcement of existing regulation (VOICE option two).
3 Drawing on theories of trade policy, industrial organization, and collective action we argue that corporate responses are shaped by potential benefits of VOICE, the collective action capacity of firms, and preferences on the "supply-side" (policy-makers).
We then assess the empirical plausibility of the model. We first derive conditions under which firms are more likely to request more government intervention and, by implication, a higher overall tax burden of the industry concerned -an outcome that many observers of the world economy might regard as more counter-intuitive (see, e.g., Tanzi 1995; Rodrik 1997) . We then examine a case where that outcome has 3 The distinction of ADJUSTMENT and VOICE resembles to some extent Hirschman's (1970) distinction of EXIT and VOICE. materialized and evaluate whether the values on the explanatory variables are the ones predicted by the model. In this case U.S. property and casualty insurers have lobbied U.S. policy-makers to offset tax advantages of Bermuda-based insurers operating in the United States.
The analysis produces preliminary support for the proposition that firms are more likely to lobby for more government intervention if: (a) the potential benefits of VOICE are high (indicated by low international mobility of firms in the VOICE group); (b) collective action capacity is high (indicated by large size of the average firm in the VOICE group, small group size, and ability to exclude free-riders);
and (c) policy-makers have, on average, signaled that they are willing to curb tax avoidance or take no action, rather than level the playing field downward by cutting taxes.
In its generic form, our explanation can account for corporate demands for tax cuts, tax increases, or other tax policy changes. Empirical work will have to show whether ADJUSTMENT or VOICE in favor of tax cuts is the dominant real-world pattern, or whether and to what extent VOICE in favor of more government intervention to halt an erosion of the corporate tax-base occurs.
Demand-Side Gap
The prisoner's dilemma captures what many political scientists and economists believe to be the logic of international tax competition (see Tanzi 1995; Basinger/Hallerberg 2001; Wilson 1999; Thomas 2000) . In the two-actor version of this game, each country is likely to lower its taxes because it risks losing investment and, depending on the elasticity with which taxable economic activity responds, perhaps also tax revenue if only the other country lowers its taxes. Note, however, that investment flows fromthe higher to the lower taxcountry will only produce higher tax revenue in the latter country if the elasticity is high enough to offset the revenue effect of the lower tax rate. As long as the two countries are unable to credibly commit to international tax harmonization the Nash equilibrium will leave both countries with the same level of investment but lower tax revenue.
Recent theoretical work has challenged this view by showing that the assumptions in the prisoner's dilemma model, as applied to international tax competition, are too rigid and simplistic. Moreover, empirical work has shown that the effect of international tax competition on states' tax revenues is likely to be smaller than suggested by the prisoner's dilemma (e.g. Persson/Tabellini 1992; Dehejia/Genschel 1999; Hallerberg/Basinger 2000) .
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Arguably the most important limitation of this research is its strong focus on the supply-side of the issue:
virtually all research explain why and how governments respond to exogenously given international pressure on domestic tax regimes by "supplying" tax reforms or tax cuts or by changing their fiscal behavior in other ways. To the extent that the demand-side appears in these explanations, its analysis remains limited to assumptions and, in rare cases, macro-level measurements of capital mobility, democracy, veto-players, partisanship, or domestic costs of tax reform more broadly.
Most authors assume that governments cut taxes in response to explicit or implicit threats by mobile investment to leave higher tax jurisdictions. The more mobile capital or other factors are, the more likely it is that governments will cave in to this pressure. A corollary of this assumption is that global market forces are pushing taxation of capital down and taxation of less mobile factors or assets up (e.g. labor, consumption, property) (e.g. Rodrik/van Ypersele 2001; Thomas 2000) . Such assumptions and arguments about capital mobility and its consequences are problematic. They imply that the effect of 5
The most substantive empirical evidence has come from statistical analyses of country-level data and from qualitative case studies. Interpretations and explanations associated with the available data differ substantially (see Webb 1998; Tanzi 1995; author 2000a) . Several authors have shown that the openness of countries to international trade and finance correlates positively with the total tax burden, but the causal effects remain disputed (Garrett 1998; Rodrik 1997; Iversen 1999; Plümper 2001; author 2000a , 2000b . Other authors (e.g. Genschel 2000b; Ganghof 2000; Rodrik/van Ypersele 2001) have questioned this proposition and the evidence supporting it. They claim that corporate taxburdens would have increased if international taxcompetition had not constrained governments' appetite for more revenue. Yet other work departs from the assumption, inherent in the aforementioned studies, that all OECD countries face very similar problems of tax competition and respond in similar ways. Explanations of why governments respond differently to international competitive pressure have concentrated mainly on domestic political institutions, most notably democracy and veto-players (Gould 2000; Baker/Gould 2001; Hallerberg/Basinger 1997 Basinger/Hallerberg 2001; Ganghof 1999). capital mobility is uniform, globally, in regard to specific countries, or at least in regard to owners of capital versus owners of less mobile assets (e.g. labor). Moreover, the empirical evidence is contradictory. For example: while taxes on mobile investment capital are being reduced in many OECD countries, taxation of property (probably the most immobile tax base) has not increased. Some authors (e.g. Garrett 1998) even claim that the capacity of states to tax and spend is only marginally affected by global economic integration.
Recent explanations have specified more clearly the conditions that limit or reduce the effect of capital mobility on national tax systems, including veto-players and partisanship (e.g. Hallerberg/Basinger 1997 Basinger/Hallerberg 2001; Baker/Gould 2001; Claassen 2001) . These explanations provide theoretically well-founded but empirically still contested explanations of cross-national variation in tax rates. However, they focus exclusively on the unit level and cannot account for variation in domestic political responses to international tax competition. That variation ultimately affects national-level taxation policy.
For example, many authors assume, at least implicitly, that when owners of mobile assets engage in tax avoidance (economic openness being the enabling condition) other economic actors will try to follow quasi automatically. In a decentralized equilibrium, capital mobility will thus set in motion a chain-reaction that drives tax rates and tax burdens down (e.g. Rodrik/van Ypersele 2001) . Qualitative case study research on domestic and international fiscal policy (e.g. Ganghof 1999; Genschel 2000a Genschel , 2000b suggest that societal responses rarely follow such a simple pattern. In the European Union, for instance, economic integration and growing international tax competition have triggered competing demands by public interest groups, business groups, governments, and bodies of the European Union. In response, the EU has engaged in a variety of efforts to limit or reduce tax competition. The degree to which different EU taxation policies have been successful in mitigating the impact of tax competition does not clearly line up with the extent to which the tax bases targeted by the respective effort are mobile (Genschel 2000b; author 2000) .
We thus submit that changes in taxation policy are not primarily a function of capital mobility per se, but of societal responses to capital mobility. As long as we do not have a more sophisticated micro-level understanding of such responses (the demand-side), explanations of fiscal policy changes -e.g. in terms of Rodrik and van Ypersele's (2001) question of when and why capital mobility is not in political equilibrium -will remain incomplete.
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In view of the fact that international tax competition is widely thought to be most rampant in the corporate sector, and that, empirically, international mobility may vary from firm to firm, rather than simply across factors of production, we consider it most useful to begin the development of such an explanation at the level of individual firms. This explanation may be regarded as a non-institutional variant of the veto-player argument operating from the micro-level upward.
Theory
In this section, we first define the outcome to be explained and then develop the explanation.
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The argument by Rodrik and van Ypersele (2001) implies, for example, that demands to reduce capital mobility will arise when the cost of capital mobility goes below a threshold (which is not specified by the authors) and the political system can (again because of capital mobility) not levy enough taxes to compensate losers.
Corporate Responses
Our explanation concentrates on what happens when restrictions on international investment and trade in goods and services decrease or disappear and some firms in a given industry exploit tax avoidance opportunities arising from such openness. We assume that the resulting differences in firms' tax burdens have a substantial effect on rates of return. If differences in tax burdens are small and do not influence rates of return firm behavior will obviously not be affected. Our explanation will not be applicable in that case. When and how differences in firms' tax burdens arise is exogenous to our explanation. We simply assume that such differences have arisen and concentrate on explaining firms' responses to this circumstance. One frequently encountered scenario is market entry by one or more large firms operating out of low tax jurisdictions.
How do other firms react to changes in their competitive position induced by international tax competition? We claim that other firms can choose among three types of responses. They can either adjust or exercise voice in two forms. ADJUSTMENT operates through the market, VOICE operates through politics.
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Depending on which type of corporate response firms choose, and which of the competing demands by different interest groups wins the approval of policy-makers, status quo tax burdens, or reductions or increases of corporate tax burdens may result.
ADJUSTMENT means that firms facing higher tax burdens than rival firms engage in tax avoidance as well, e.g. by relocating headquarters to lower tax jurisdictions. The distinction of ADJUSTMENT and VOICE resembles to some extent Hirschman's (1970) distinction of EXIT and VOICE. For an earlier application of Hirschman's concepts to taxation policy see Peters 1991. Peters uses variables such as "morality", "political act of rejecting the state", and "Voting behavior" to explain individuals' choices of EXIT or VOICE. 8 Note that we do not use the concepts of ADJUSTMENT and EXIT synonymously. We consider EXIT from the respective market (through closure of the firm or production of other goods) to be the most radical form of VOICE can materialize in two forms. Firms facing higher tax burdens than rival firms can lobby the government to lower taxes of all firms in the given industry or economic sector, or all firms in the entire jurisdiction, down to the level those firms engaging in tax avoidance would be willing to pay (establish a level playing field at lower levels of de facto taxation). Or they can lobby the government to close loopholes in the taxation system, which eliminates the competitive advantage of firms engaging in tax avoidance (establish a level playing field at higher levels of taxation).
The three types of corporate responses are not mutually exclusive, though some combinations of these responses are more likely to occur in reality than others.
9 For example, firms may simultaneously engage in tax avoidance and lobby the government to lower taxes. But it is unlikely that firms will lobby for new regulations against tax avoidance while themselves engaging in tax avoidance. Our case-study work suggests, however, that, empirically, the three types of responses can be distinguished quite easily.
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Explanation
In explaining when which type of corporate response is more likely, and why, we draw on theories of trade policy, industrial organization, and collective action.
The assumption of factor mobility has been the subject of a long debate in trade policy theories (e.g.
ADJUSTMENT. In practice, we could not find evidence for this form of corporate response to international tax competition. Moreover, we include only a narrow range of adjustment behavior in our definition. In principle, one could define any effort by firms to restructure their activity to compensate for tax disadvantages as ADJUSTMENT -e.g. increasing productivity. Such a definition would be problematic because one should assume that all firms engage in such efforts all the time, irrespective of whether they experience disadvantageous tax burdens. Verdier 1998; Alt/Gilligan 1994; Rogowski 1989; Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Midford 1993; Hiscox 2001; Irwin 1995; Magee 1978; Milner 2002) These theories can be employed to infer preferences of interest groups in situations where factor mobility varies not only across large societal groups, factors of production, or economic sectors, but also across firms, even within the same industry. Variation in factor mobility across firms shapes the extent to which these firms are affected by the integration of world markets, and, consequently, also firms' preferences and behavior in regard to taxation policy.
Theories of industrial organization have emphasized asset-specificity in explaining how firms organize, what preferences they have in regard to a variety of policies, and how they behave politically (e.g. Williamson 1985; Schonhardt-Bailey 1991; Murphy 1995; Murphy and Oye 1998; Alt and Shepsle 1995; Hathaway 1998; Frieden 1991; Alt et al. 1999 ).
While demand for trade protection has been explained both in terms of factor mobility and assetspecificity (as well as other factors), the literature on international tax competition has concentrated primarily on capital mobility. The relationship between these two concepts is only vaguely defined in extant work, which may pose problems in constructing an explanation that draws on these two literatures. We thus provide some clarification at this point.
Capital mobility is conventionally defined as the ability of investment funds to flow across international borders. Empirically, capital mobility is usually measured in terms of the presence or absence of regulatory restrictions on in-or outflowing capital, or in terms of theoretically more complex indicators, such as interest rate convergence (e.g. Plümper 2001 ). Asset specificity is commonly defined as a feature of durable or fixed assets that have no or little value if used for alternative purposes. Closely related to asset-specificity is the concept of sunk costs. These are opportunity costs incurred in the past, and which are irretrievable (e.g. Geroski et al.1990 ).
Capital mobility and asset-specificity may affect firms' responses to uneven tax burdens in distinct ways.
In some cases, firms with very specific assets (e.g. large investment in a unique technology, say a computer software) can be very mobile internationally in terms of where they site their production, headquarters, and tax base. In other cases, asset specificity can act as a barrier to international mobility (e.g. investment in mining or utilities). Whether capital mobility or asset-specificity is a better predictor of firms' responses to uneven tax burdens will depend largely on the characteristics of a given economic sector or the type of economic activity more specifically. We elaborate on this point further below.
Adding key variables from collective action theory to theories focusing on the effects of factor mobility and asset-specificity is straightforward (Olson 1965; Schattschneider 1935; Gourevitch 1986; Grier et al. 1994; Marwell/Oliver 1993; Hathaway 1998) . For example, owners of less mobile investment facing high adjustment costs are more likely to lobby their government if the firms concerned are large and few.
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From these theories we derive three explanatory variables:
(1) potential benefits of VOICE, which are a function of international factor mobility 12 and assetspecificity;
(2) the collective action capacity of firms, which is a function of firm size, the size of the interest group deciding on whether or not to lobby the government, and the ability to exclude free-riders.
Large size and small number of firms reduce the free-rider problem that often plagues lobbying. Moreover, large firms, because they employ many voters and can invest more resources in lobbying, are more likely to be heard by politicians.
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We use the term factor mobility in the remainder of the paper, because it is more generic than capital mobility. Although, in some cases, asset-specificity implies that assets are internationally less mobile, we treat international factor mobility and asset-specificity as two distinct concepts.
(3) preferences on the supply-side (policy-makers).
Potential Benefits of VOICE. Firms facing higher adjustment costs will perceive higher potential benefits of VOICE, and are thus more likely to engage in VOICE. The extent of firms' economic distress also tends to influence policy-makers' receptiveness to VOICE (Hansen 1990; Hathaway 1998) . Assuming that firms in distress know this, they have an additional incentive to engage in VOICE.
Adjustment costs are largely a function of international factor mobility and asset-specificity. As noted above, the latter two can have distinct effects. We expect that VOICE is most likely if international factor mobility of a firm is low (no possibility to relocate its tax-base to a low-tax jurisdiction) and its assets are specific (no possibility to convert assets to the production of other goods and services less susceptible to tax-disadvantages, without geographically relocating the tax-base). Conversely, when international factor mobility is high and/or asset-specificity is low, firms are more likely to engage in ADJUSTMENT. High international factor mobility facilitates tax avoidance (ADJUSTMENT) with or without relocation of the tax base. Factor mobility is thus a necessary but probably not a sufficient condition for ADJUSTMENT. 13 Tax avoidance without relocation is, despite ever more ingenious accounting practices and communications technology, still more difficult for owners of internationally less mobile than for owners of more mobile factors. For example, computer software producers or consulting firms 13 Neither international factor mobility nor asset-specificity are necessary or sufficient conditions for the other three types of corporate responses.
with affiliates around the world will find it easier to reduce their tax burden through transfer pricing, "thin capitalization", or other practices than local savings and loan banks. The same holds for the relocation of headquarters and/or production to lower tax jurisdictions. Asset-specificity, in this context, is of lesser importance. In the financial sector, for example, firms may have highly specific but internationally very mobile investments. In certain cases, however, asset-specificity may preclude international mobility (e.g.
sunk costs in steel production or mining).
Finally, factor mobility and asset-specificity (and also the second explanatory variable, collective action capacity) explain whether firms select VOICE or ADJUSTMENT. Which of the two VOICE options firms choose is contingent on the third variable, the receptiveness of policy-makers to one or the other VOICE option.
14 Collective Action Capacity: Firms that could potentially benefit from VOICE -notably those with immobile and/or asset-specific investments experiencing competitive pressure from more mobile firms subject to lower tax burdens -face a collective action problem: they need to mobilize enough support within their industry or beyond to effectively lobby policy-makers to either reduce taxes (first VOICE option) or to close loopholes in the applicable tax regime (second VOICE option). If the collective action capacity is low, firms are less likely to engage in VOICE. And even if they do so, their efforts are likely to be less successful.
14 More generic models explaining lobbying in fiscal policy in terms of potential benefits of VOICE may have to incorporate other determinants of these benefits. Hathaway (1998) , for example, has used capital intensity and trade dependence in explaining lobbying in trade policy. Because of our focus on tax competition with an empirical illustration from the insurance sector, where capital intensity and trade dependence are less relevant (there is too little variation across firms), we restrict the argument to international factor mobility and asset-specificity.
The extent of collective action capacity is a function of three variables: the size and number of firms that perceive a comparative tax disadvantage and could potentially benefit from VOICE, and the ability of the lobbying firms to exclude free-riders from the expected benefits of lobbying.
First, in relative terms, larger firms experience lower lobbying costs. As noted by Alt et al. (1999:103) :
"if the cost of contacting {joint lobbying by management and labor} is essentially fixed...then larger firms...would have anticipated a greater likelihood of success from lobbying and thus been more inclined to pursue these funds {lobby for subsidies}..." Even more straightforward, larger firms are more likely to be heard by policy-makers because they employ more voters.
Second, small groups of firms anticipating substantial benefits if lobbying is successful are more likely to engage in VOICE -their costs of organizing are smaller, group members' interests tend to be more homogeneous, and individual benefits are, on average, larger and more visible. 15 Public choice theory holds, moreover, that groups striving for economic benefits are likely to favor a smaller number of members with whom they must share the benefits of government intervention, whereas public interest groups seek to maximize the number of supporters. This point is made most explicitly in positive economic theories of regulation (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Meier 1988; Baron 1995 Baron , 2000 ; see also Frieden/Martin 2001:16) . It holds that firms often seek (and get) regulation that protects them from domestic or foreign competitors. Group size is closely related to the third variable, which captures problems of exclusion and free-riding.
Third, collective action capacity is higher if free-riders can be excluded. Conversely, if firms not participating in a lobbying effort can also enjoy the benefits if lobbying succeeds, the so called k-group 15 We agree with Marwell and Oliver (1993: ch. 3) that whether group size affects the likelihood and extent of collective action will be influenced by interdependence among actors:one actor's participation in the production of a collective good may affect other actor's participation. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict the analysis to group size per se.
will be larger and collective action (lobbying) less likely.
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Group size and the ability to exclude free-riders figure prominently in one of the key arguments of positive economic theories of regulation: if the costs of policy-change inspired or driven by lobbying will fall on a large group of actors, whereas a small group of lobbying firms expects substantial benefits, VOICE is more likely because policy-changes associated with such a cost-benefit distribution are more likely to be effectively implemented. To the extent that free-riders can be excluded, the benefits will be more concentrated on the lobbying firms. The free-rider issue is also relevant in the context of policymakers' preferences, because the two VOICE options are associated with different degrees of freeriding (see below).
In brief, firms perceiving a tax disadvantage are more likely to opt for VOICE if: (a) they are, on average, large; (b) the number of firms perceiving such disadvantages is small; and (c) firms not participating in the lobbying effort can be excluded from its expected benefits.
Preferences on the "supply-side". Potential benefits of VOICE and collective action capacity explain firms' choices between VOICE and ADJUSTMENT. These variables do not account for which of the two VOICE options firms choose. We propose that preferences on the supply-side (policy-makers) influence firms' choice between the two VOICE options, particularly to the extent that the lobbying firms are indifferent as to whether taxes are reduced or loopholes in the taxation system are closed, as long as a level playing field for all firms results.
Assuming indifference of firms between VOICE option one and two, VOICE in terms of lobbying for closure of loopholes in the taxation system and/or stricter enforcement of existing tax regulations is more likely if policy-makers prefer to, or are even under pressure to, maintain or increase government revenue 16 The k-group denotes the group of firms willing to jointly engage in VOICE irrespective of what other firms do.
(e.g. in times of substantial budget deficits). Supply-side preferences for or against VOICE option one or two may also derive from ideological inclination (e.g. leftist governments tend to be less inclined to grant tax cuts than rightist governments).
Relaxing the assumption of indifference brings us back to collective action theory. If policy-makers appear willing (e.g. in the sense that there are precedents and/or public statements to that end) to grant industry-specific tax cuts or even tax cuts exclusively for the lobbying firms, lobbying to that end will be stronger -in that case, the expected benefits are concentrated and the costs in terms of reduced government revenue dispersed. If policy-makers appear receptive to the idea of tax cuts, but for reasons of fairness, not biasing competition, or other reasons, favor tax cuts for all firms in a specific economic sector, or even all corporate taxpayers in the jurisdiction, lobbying will be weaker because there is a free-rider problem. In that case, firms are more likely to choose VOICE option two -lobbying in favor of curbing tax avoidance. This option is less susceptible to free-riding because lobbying, if successful, only reduces the tax advantages of a few specific firms that compete with the lobbying group. Incentives to engage in VOICE option two are even stronger when the lobbying firms expect government intervention to produce protectionist rents as tax authorities impose de facto market access restrictions on competitor firms engaging in tax avoidance.
Caveats. Three limitations of the above explanation need to be emphasized. First, our explanation accounts only for the demand for tax policy changes, not their supply. By incorporating preferences of policy-makers, it touches only implicitly on the supply-side. Theories focusing on the political costs of tax reforms, including the veto-player argument, could serve as a useful starting point for constructing a more comprehensive explanation that includes both supply-and demand-side arguments. (See Hallerberg/Basinger 1997 Baker/Gould 2001; Sun/Pelkmans 1995) Second, the explanation does not include institutional constraints and opportunities. By influencing patterns of delegation and aggregation, institutions may have an effect on whether and how effectively certain interest groups organize and lobby (e.g. Greenwood/Aspinwall 1997) . In the empirical case we use to assess the empirical relevance of the explanation, institutional factors are of lesser importance.
Nonetheless, a more comprehensive explanation that is applicable to a wider range of cases and integrates demand-and supply-side elements will have to include institutional variables.
Third, if applied to empirical cases with a long history, a more dynamic perspective will be useful. It is possible, for example, that firms exposed to increasing tax disadvantages will, over time, restructure their operations to the extent that international factor mobility increases and/or asset-specificity decreases. At the same time, increased competition may change the characteristics of the entire industry in which these firms operate. If, for example, average firm size decreases due to restructuring, or if the share of foreign affiliates in these firms' total assets and profits increases, the collective action potential may decrease. In that case, ADJUSTMENT would become more likely than VOICE. 17 With a view to the short history of the empirical case we examine in the second part of this paper, we do not expand further on this point.
Evidence from the U.S. Insurance Industry
To assess the empirical relevance of the above explanation we examine corporate responses to international tax competition in the U.S. insurance industry. In doing so, we follow Marwell and Oliver 17 For an analysis along these lines, see Hathaway 1998 Hathaway . (1993 To avoid the obvious degrees of freedom problem inherent in a single case study, we derive a set of conditions under which VOICE in favor of more government intervention is more likely. We focus on this outcome because it cuts against the popular hypothesis that international tax competition promotes downward convergence. We then engage in a pattern-matching exercise. We analyze a case in which some U.S. insurance companies experienced tax disadvantages vis-a-vis competitors operating out of Bermuda and have lobbied the U.S. Congress to curb tax avoidance (second type of VOICE). Given that we know how a specific group of firms has responded to tax competition in this case (the dependent variable in the explanation), we examine whether the values on the explanatory variables are the ones our theory predicts. Further empirical work along the theoretical lines proposed here should evaluate whether this type of corporate response is common or whether ADJUSTMENT or VOICE in favor of tax cuts is the dominant pattern.
From the theoretical argument we can derive that firms are more likely to lobby for a level playing field at a higher level of government intervention, if:
1. The potential benefits of VOICE are large: members of the VOICE group hold internationally less mobile and more specific assets and experience substantial tax disadvantages vis-a-vis competitors that engage in tax avoidance.
2. The collective action capacity is high: the average firm in the VOICE group is comparatively large; the VOICE group is relatively small; and it is able to exclude free-riders.
3. Policy-makers prefer to curb tax avoidance rather than cut taxes: they signal that they are unwilling to level the playing field at lower levels of taxation, either by granting firm-or industry-specific or even economy-wide tax cuts.
For firms in the ADJUSTMENT group the observations for these variables point in the opposite direction.
We begin by outlining the conditions exogenous to our theory, that is, how the problem of uneven tax burdens in the U.S. commercial insurance industry emerged. We then describe the outcome in terms of VOICE and ADJUSTMENT. Third, we provide evidence on the three explanatory variables.
Starting Point
Bermuda developed into a tax haven in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The world-wide lifting of restrictions on international transfers of capital and on trade in services, and the revolution in communications technology are, to a large degree, responsible for this development. They enabled some companies to relocate their domicile (but not their markets, and only a small portion of their employees!)
to countries with lower taxes, including Bermuda.
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Until the late 1990s, insurers operating out of Bermuda did not compete on a significant scale with U.S.
insurance firms in the latters' home market because they concentrated mainly on reinsurance.
Reinsurance is only a rather small part of the total U.S. insurance market. In the 1990s, reinsurance firms located in Bermuda were able to accumulate large amounts of capital. This accumulation resulted mainly from little exposure to historic or "long-tail" risks, and the absence of corporate income taxes.
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To employ this excess capital more productively they began to invest in other countries' insurance markets in the late 1990s. This development produced uneven tax burdens for insurance firms operating in the U.S. market. In summer 1999, the biggest Bermuda-based insurer, ACE, bought the property and In brief, some U.S. insurance companies adjusted by merging with Bermuda-based firms and/or redomiciling to Bermuda. Why have other insurance firms not followed this strategy, but have instead chosen the second VOICE option -lobbying policy-makers to curb tax avoidance? The theory outlined above provides relevant answers.
Potential Benefits of VOICE
The potential benefits of VOICE are shaped by international factor mobility and asset specificity. The empirical evidence will falsify the above proposition if firms in the VOICE group hold internationally more mobile and less specific assets than firms in the ADJUSTMENT group. The evidence suggests that this is not the case.
Because none of the firms in the ADJUSTMENT and VOICE groups changed its business activity in a significant way we conclude that differences in asset-specificity cannot account for variation in responses to tax competition in the case examined here. We presume, however, that variation in asset-specificity could be important in other empirical cases and propose to maintain the distinction of asset-specificity and factor mobility for further research.
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Variation across firms in international factor mobility has had a strong effect on corporate responses in the U.S./Bermuda insurance case. Crucial in this regard are differences in costs incurred by firms in accessing reinsurance markets in low tax countries (in this case, Bermuda). One option would be to examine more subtle forms of asset-specificity. The risk involved is that the empirical bounds of the concepts are unclear. Geroski et al. (1990:62) note that "Although asset specificity may be the ultimate barrier to capital mobility, the identification of the relevant specific asset(s) may prove too difficult to make the concept empirically useful in all situations."
The principal mechanism commercial property and casualty insurance firms operating in the U.S. market can use to transfer capital to Bermuda and thus avoid taxes on investment income and discounting of loss reserves is reinsurance. The costs of using this mechanism and thus ultimately cashing in on the economic benefits offered by inter-jurisdictional differences of tax burdens differ substantially across firms in the VOICE and the ADJUSTMENT group. Existing tax legislation implies that as long as an insurance firm is domiciled in the United States it can not avoid taxes by moving premiums to tax havens through intra-firm reinsurance.
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Under these circumstances the potential benefits of VOICE derive from the extent of the competitive disadvantage of U.S. based firms, and the costs of redomiciling to Bermuda. The larger the disadvantage and the higher the costs of redomiciling, the greater is the incentive to engage in VOICE.
First, it is difficult to determine with precision how big the de facto tax disadvantage of U.S.-based commercial property and casualty insurers is. The VOICE group claims profit advantages through tax evasion of up to 10 percent, whereas the opponents concede minimal advantages. Independent analysts' assessments lie roughly in the middle. (Business Insurance, 11.13.2000; Best's Insurance News 26 When a U.S. subsidiary of a parent company domiciled abroad reinsures a risk underwritten in the United States with a reinsurance affiliate of the parent based abroad, that transaction is subject to a one time one percent federal excise tax. Investment income on reserves held abroad for U.S. risks is not subject to taxation in this case. The premiums transferred fromthe United States to Bermuda through an intra-firm reinsurance transaction are treated as a business expense and are deducted, thus reducing taxable profits in the United States. Returns on investments with these premiums in Bermuda accumulate in a tax-free environment. Insurance firms domiciled in the United States are subject to taxation (of up to 35 percent) of investment income on reserves if they reinsure U.S. risks with (and thus cede premiums to) an affiliated firm abroad. This feature of the U.S. taxation system, which is unintentional, tends to favor reinsurers domiciled in low taxcountries. The advantage arises primarily in a related party context because affiliated insurers or reinsurers domiciled in low tax countries may transfer the taxable nexus of investment income among members of the same economic unit at virtually no cost while they remain exposed to the same risks as before the reinsurance transaction. (Business Insurance, 6.12.2000) 5. 11.2000; Best Wire, 3.8.2000; Reinsurance, 11.1.2000; National Underwriter, 3.8.2000; Business Insurance, 12.18.2000; National Underwriter 7.24.2000; Forbes 5.29.2000:090) Second, assessing the cost of relocation answers most directly to the question of international mobility.
The available evidence suggests that firms in the VOICE group faced higher costs of removing their competitive disadvantage through redomiciliation to a low-tax country than firms in the ADJUSTMENT group. The costs of redomiciling derive, in this context, primarily from the age of firms and the maturity For firms in the VOICE group, relocating to Bermuda would have resulted in a higher tax burden for shareholders and the firms themselves. Chubb, for example, claimed that it would have to sell the company and pay capital gains taxes on this sale before redomiciliation could take place. It expected this tax to more than offset any future tax benefits from redomiciliation. (National Underwriter, 4.10.2000) 27 Ideally, one should calculate the differences across firms in taxes that would result from redomiciliation. Such calculation would require knowledge on each shareholder's potentially taxable gains, which is not available. The available evidence suggests, however, that the above argument is plausible. Chubb and Hartford, the two leaders of the VOICE group, are long-established firms with deep reserves and a strong shareholder base (Table 1 and Figure 2) . Moreover, property and casualty insurers' stocks, 27 In more abstract terms, older or long-established firms are more likely to have a larger number of shareholders who own shares that are worth much more than their purchase price. Redomiciliation is achieved by exchanging existing shares for newly issued shares of a foreign holding company. This transaction is taxed according to the gain inherent in each shareholder's shares. Assuming that older firms, by virtue of their longevity, are likely to have been profitable, their shareholder base is likely to incur higher taxes when shares are exchanged. Shareholders of newer firms, in contrast, are likely to have less appreciation in their shares. The lower tax, in these cases, is a lesser impediment to redomiciliation. We are very grateful to Bill Malchodi and Joel Freedman from The Hartford for helping us in clarifying this point.
including those of the American Financial Group, Chubb, and the Hartford, soared throughout 1999 and 2000. In all likelihood, this trend would have increased taxable gains, had firms in the VOICE group decided to redomicile. (National Underwriter, 9.18.2000) In comparison, the firms that redomiciled to Bermuda were much younger and had a much smaller shareholder base than the average firm in the VOICE group. The combination of younger age and smaller shareholder base enabled firms in the ADJUSTMENT group to move their domicile at comparatively lower cost. It is interesting to note that mostly smaller reinsurance firms redomiciled to Bermuda.
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One might thus jump to the conclusion that reinsurance firms, and smaller ones in particular, are inherently more mobile than multi-line insurers. Many financial analysts argue, in fact, that reinsurance is the most globalized part of the insurance market (National Underwriter, 10.20.1997 ). It appears difficult, however, to make a 28 Everest Re, for example, used trust-preferred securities and debt, which are tax deductible (National Underwriter, 9.27.1999). White Mountains' redomiciliation to Bermuda was essentially tax-free for shareholders, but the company expected to incur a tax liability of between $5 and 20 million. (National Underwriter, 10.4.1999) The amount of a firm's equity capital per se does not indicate how big the tax burden resulting from redomiciliation would be. We assume, however, that older firms with a larger amount of equity capital would experience a larger absolute tax burden if they decided to redomicile. Shareholders of older firms with more equity capital are thus more likely to oppose redomiciliation of their firm. The only exception was the Everest Reinsurance Holding, which also runs some property and casualty services under a subsidiary called Everest National Insurance Group. Of the three companies which, by mid-2001, had redomiciled to Bermuda (Everest Reinsurance Holding, PX Re, and White Mountains Insurance Group), only Everest Re belonged to the top ten reinsurance companies, and its total assets were much smaller than the total assets of firms in the VOICE group (see Tables 2 and 3 , and http://www.everestre.com).
theoretically meaningful argument that reinsurance firms are inherently more mobile than other types of insurance firms. The economic literature does not offer a systematic empirical argument for why this may be so. We thus rely on the above evidence centering on tax burdens associated with relocation, which derive from corporate structure. 31 Finally, it should be noted that the benefit of closing the disputed loophole is not necessarily contingent on whether legislation is ultimately adopted and implemented. Hartford's director of government affairs, for example, noted that tax avoidance through reinsurance schemes has already been reduced to some extent because of increased scrutiny by Congress, the Treasury, and the IRS. 
Collective Action Capacity
The second explanation focuses on the ability of interest groups to mobilize and lobby policy-makers. If some firms expect substantial benefits of engaging in VOICE, and if the collective action capacity of these firms is high, VOICE on the part of these firms is more likely. The empirical evidence will falsify this proposition if the number of firms in the VOICE group is large, if the average firm in this group is comparatively small, and if this group is unable to exclude free-riders from the benefits of lobbying.
Number of firms. The VOICE group has organized in the Coalition for Tax Fairness. As noted above, this group includes six commercial property and casualty insurers: American Financial Group Inc., Chubb Corp., Hartford Financial Services Group Inc., Kemper Insurance Cos., Liberty Mutual Group, 31 Another reason given by firms in the VOICE group for not relocating to Bermuda was that they feared that if they would all re-locate this would cause a backlash among policy-makers and would lead to closure of loopholes in the U.S. tax system. Relocation would thus not be beneficial in the medium to long term. and PMA Capital. (Best's Insurance News, 8.8.2001) In comparison, the ADJUMSTMENT group has organized less coherently. Some firms, such as ACE, have lobbied policy-makers directly. Most opponents of the proposed legislation have, however, lobbied through a variety of pre-existing interest groups that represent relatively large numbers of firms.
The membership of most of these groups is also more heterogeneous than the membership of the VOICE group since it includes insurance and non-insurance firms. In comparison, none of the firms in the ADJUSTMENT group is even nearly as large as the average firm in the VOICE group (Table 3a and As to the ADJUSTMENT group, ACE and XL-Capital, the two Bermuda-based insurers that bought U.S. firms 38 and thus triggered the dispute, are among the biggest on the island. The total assets of ACE amount to U.S.$ 31.69 billion, those of XL-Capital to U.S.$ 16.9 billion (figures for the year 2000).
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Their size is comparable to that of large U.S. insurance firms. However, the fact that they are based abroad acts as a constraint on translating firm size into political leverage. The ADJUSTMENT group can reward legislators receptive to its demands with campaign contributions. But Bermuda-based firms will find it harder to deliver voter support, and to claim to be defending U.S. jobs. Moreover, U.S.
policy-makers are more likely to adopt regulation that imposes costs on "foreign" rather than domestic corporations.
Ability to exclude free-riders. Tax The precise costs and benefits for particular firms or economic sectors are unknown, and no detailed estimates exist. However, the evidence and assumptions discussed so far, as well as the behavior of opponents and proponents, are sufficient for a preliminary assessment of the theoretical argument on free-riding. The cost-benefit structure of proposed legislation has led to claims by the opponents that the demands by the VOICE group are unwarranted or even protectionist. Bermuda-based firms have, predictably, been the most active opponents of the proposed Reinsurance Tax Equity Act.
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Firms and interest groups that would more indirectly experience costs of the measure (notably those buying insurance), have pointed to broader problems associated with the proposed legislation. They have claimed that it would force Bermuda-based insurers to raise their premiums and give U.S.-based insurers cover to raise their rates in a slowly hardening market, i.e. a market where rates are rising and bad risks in insurers' portfolios are being reduced.
41
Preferences on the Supply-Side
The third explanation holds that VOICE in favor of stopping tax evasion is more likely if firms perceiving tax disadvantages receive credible signals from policy-makers that the latter are more likely to agree to 40 ACE, for example, has argued that the proposed legislation is a "protectionist measure cloaked under the moniker of tax fairness." (Best's Review, 6.1.2001) It claims that this measure is largely an effort to stem ACE's rapid expansion into the U.S. market.
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The commercial property and casualty insurance industry had, in the mid-to late 1990s, suffered heavily fromrate wars and large underwriting losses. Since the late 1990s, members of the VOICE group in particular have been reassessing and re-pricing insurance at renewals, rather than acquiring new market shares. As a result, commercial insurance rates, which had previously fallen to very low levels, have risen by around 20 percent from October 1998 -October 2000. Hence the interest of the VOICE group in preventing Bermuda-based firms fromundercutting this trend. (Business Insurance, 5.28.2001; Best's Review, 1.1.2001; National Underwriter, 3.13.2000 , 4.10.2000 Insurance Information Institute Database, 10 March 2000) . Some analysts note that the hardening of the market could also reduce the motivation of U.S. based insurers to challenge offshore competitors (Business Insurance, 11.13.2000; Forbes 5.29.2000:090) . However, the decline of stockmarkets since 2000 has kept investment income from offsetting inadequate pricing and underwriting losses for most insurance firms (National Underwriter, 3.27.2000) , increasing the likelihood that the VOICE group will pursue its quest. curbing tax avoidance than to cutting taxes. The proposition can be proven wrong if there is stronger evidence for policy-makers' willingness to supply firm-or industry-specific tax cuts to re-establish a level playing field.
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The available evidence consists of legislative precedents and statements by policy-makers. It suggests that tax cuts exclusively for the VOICE group were less likely than support for measures to close loopholes in U.S. tax laws. As noted in the theory section, lobbying is more likely if the benefits of VOICE are concentrated on the VOICE group. If lobbying would benefit the entire industry (e.g. tax cuts for the entire insurance industry, or even for all corporate actors), there is a free-rider problem. The prisoner's dilemma hypothesis in fact suggests that policy-makers' will respond to situations such as the one examined here by downward harmonization -i.e. by reducing taxes burdens of the VOICE group to reduce the competitive disadvantage of domestic firms and to avoid relocation by disadvantaged domestic firms. In terms of statements by policy-makers, the evidence suggests that the average legislator preferred to close the tax loophole or take no action, rather than support tax reductions for the VOICE group. Those legislators that have gone on public record in support of the Reinsurance Tax Equity Act have almost invariably emphasized the problem of lost tax revenue, loss of U.S. jobs as insurance firms redomicile, and unfair competition. Those few legislators who criticized the bill at least implicitly proposed to maintain the status quo. Apart from a few vague references by such legislators to solve the problem by making the tax environment more attractive for U.S.-based firms, no specific proposals for tax cuts for the VOICE group have been made. 43 Against this background, it is hard to see how firms in the VOICE group could have persuaded policy-makers to cut corporate taxes on these firms down to Bermuda levels -essentially from 35 percent to zero.
Another approach to assessing ex-ante the preferences on the supply-side could focus on actual tax revenue losses. The higher these losses, the more likely policy-makers are to opt for closing the tax loophole, particularly in phases of budget deficits, and/or when a liberal (in the U.S. sense of the term) 43 See, e.g., National Underwriter, 7.16.2001 Underwriter, 7.16. , 3.26.2001 Underwriter, 7.16. , 4.10.2000 Dow Jones International News, 7.9.2001; Best's Review, 6.1.2001 , 7.20.2001 Business Insurance, 5.28.2001 , 11.13.2000 , 10.05.2000 
Conclusion
The analysis of international tax competition and its political and economic effects is part of a larger research program on economic globalization and its societal consequences. In this paper we have explained corporate responses to international tax competition. This demand-side explanation, which operates from the firm-level upward and illuminates political processes set in motion by international differences in corporate tax burdens, complements efforts to understand the "supply-side" of the issue, i.e. policy-makers' fiscal behavior. It accounts for ADJUSTMENT and two types of VOICE on the part of firms in terms of potential benefits of VOICE, the collective action capacity of firms, and
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The New York Times (6 March 2000) quoted U.S.$ 7 billion in lost tax revenue at the federal level (4% of the Treasury's income from taxing U.S. corporations) if all U.S. property and casualty insurers took advantage of opportunities to shelter profits in foreign tax havens. 45 See, e.g., National Underwriter, 4.3.2000 Underwriter, 4.3. , 4.3.2000 Underwriter, 4.3. , 7.16.2001 Underwriter, 4.3. , 8.28.2000 Underwriter, 4.3. , 9.27.1999 Underwriter, 4.3. , 10.4.1999 Business Insurance 7.9.2001 , 11.13.2000 Reinsurance, 11.01.2000; National Journal, 10.14.2000; NYT, 3.6.2000 NYT, 3.6. , 10.05.2000 preferences on the supply-side. We have used evidence on corporate responses to international tax competition in the U.S. insurance market to illustrate the empirical plausibility of our explanation. This evidence is largely in line with theoretical arguments.
Further research should focus on three areas.
First, we need more empirical information on the conditions exogenous to the explanation offered in this paper. In particular, we need to know more about the extent to which international tax competition has led to uneven tax burdens of firms competing in the same markets in a broader range of economic sectors and countries. Such information will be required to assess whether such conditions can be left exogenous to theories of corporate responses to tax competition or whether they should be endogenized. It will also be necessary to identify a larger part of the overall population of such cases from which to draw unbiased samples for analysis. In the absence of such information, there is a high risk of selection bias towards cases of VOICE.
Second, the theoretical argument used here is very simple. More empirical work will have to show whether the explanation can provide meaningful explanations of outcomes in other cases, for example cases where institutional structures are very different from the United States (e.g. in the European Union), or cases where the country concerned is much smaller. One might assume, for example, that ADJUSTMENT is more likely than VOICE option two in small open economies with liberal governments. Cases that might be studied along these lines include the dispute over U.S. Foreign Sales Corporations, the worldwide unitary tax case in California, taxes on securities transactions in OECD countries, or exemptions from consumption taxes in many EU countries.
Following larger trends in the trade policy literature, further theoretical work on the demand-side of international tax competition could proceed in two directions. First, in pursuit of the perspective adopted in this paper, more sophisticated theories on the role of industry groups in fiscal policy-making could be developed. 46 Second, explanations at a higher level of aggregation, e.g. focusing on a factor-based (land, labor, capital) approach and explaining corporate responses at the level of entire industries or economic sectors, could be helpful in explaining broader trends in fiscal policies across countries, sectors, or industries.
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Third, the explanation and its empirical assessment concentrate on explaining corporate behavior, and not policy-makers' fiscal behavior (individually or in terms of policy-output and its economic consequences). While the demand-side approach pursued here may be more systematic than the supply-side approach in terms of building theory from the firm-level upward, it does not capture a variety of domestic and international processes and structures that may also shape policy-outcomes.
Predictions concerning the outcome of the U.S./Bermuda tax case are thus outside the purview of this analysis. Explanations integrating the demand-and supply-side perspective are clearly desirable. The political economy literature on interest groups and regulation could provide a good starting point for linking demand-and supply-side explanations (e.g. Downs 1957; Olson 1961; Stigler 1971; Baron 2000) .
Despite these limitations, we hope that the explanation outlined and illustrated in this paper offers a useful starting point for a research program that focuses on international tax competition and its political and economic consequences from the demand-side.
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Pioneers of this approach in the trade policy literature include, for example, Schattschneider (1935) and Gourevitch (1986) . 
